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Opinion: In her address to the Asia Summit in Wellington on October 15, Suhasini Haidar, Diplomatic Affairs Editor at The Hindu, observed that we are living in the “age of the alpha”.
She was referring to the rise of authoritarian leaders – figures less concerned with upholding global norms or universal values and more focused on advancing narrow political, strategic, or economic objectives that typically benefit a select few and come at the expense of many. Or as Haidar remarked, “leaders behaving badly”.
Sadly, the world has no shortage of such leaders, from the Taliban in Afghanistan and Myanmar’s military junta to Russia under Vladimir Putin.
However, it extends beyond the more obvious examples of autocracy.
The actions of democratically elected leaders, too, are being scrutinised for their adherence to international law, double standards, exclusions, exceptions and repression.
In an age of alpha leaders, how far is too far?
The escalating diplomatic standoff between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau offers us a real-time example.
What has begun as a dispute between two friendly nations now serves as a broader test of Indo-Pacific partnerships – particularly between the West, including the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, and India as a rising Asian power.
New Zealand has good reason to follow this case closely.
At its core, this dispute tests the boundaries of acceptable state behaviour between friendly powers.
Trudeau accuses India of orchestrating a campaign of harassment and extrajudicial assassinations targeting Sikh activists in Canada who advocate for an independent sovereign state within Indian territory (Khalistan).
Trudeau argues that as long as Canadian citizens of Indian heritage are not breaking Canadian law, they have the right to gather, protest, and fundraise without fear of foreign interference or intimidation, regardless of how much India disapproves of their activities.
On the other hand, Modi’s government argues that Canada has become a haven for Khalistan activists – a number of whom it has designated terrorists. India cites concerns over threats to its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and past terror attacks as evidence the threat is real. India expects Canada to take action against these individuals to preserve their bilateral relationship and respect India’s sovereignty.
The complexities of the dispute run deep, and both sides have valid points.
India has long felt that the West downplays the terror threats faced on the subcontinents. Like other major powers, India is resistant to being told how to handle its own national security concerns but expects partners to help when asked.
On matters related to counterterrorism, India would naturally expect some empathy. This is a familiar frame for the West. Think Osama bin Laden, Qasem Soleimani, and the many US-led assassinations of Al-Qaeda and Islamic State operatives.
Yet the fundamental question remains: where does legitimate state action end, and bad behaviour begin? Canada is clear that the line has been crossed, and it appears – if the evidence holds up – that Five Eyes partners agree.
Though there is yet to be any definitive proof released that Modi himself is directing these operations, those familiar with India’s security apparatus are unsurprised by the involvement of Indian authorities.
Moving forward, each partner has high stakes in the dispute being resolved quickly, amicably and in accordance with the law. It appears, however, neither side is in the mood to be cordial.
Trudeau’s very public outing of India has left a sour taste in India’s mouth. Modi is unlikely to accept this kind of public shaming, even if he is willing to work through the issue behind closed doors. Many will recall the same dynamics with China and the emergence of the “Wuhan virus”.
The real uncertainty lies in how far this dispute will escalate – and whether it could disrupt the growing alliance between India and the West in the Indo-Pacific.
For Canada, the implications are significant, with the potential to affect trade and bilateral relations as well as the two-way movement of people.
New Zealand, meanwhile, must weigh these developments against its own priorities with India.
At the forefront of our relationship is the New Zealand Government’s desire to deepen trade ties, either through a comprehensive free trade agreement or a more modest interim deal.
Despite current two-way trade being valued at NZ$2.8 billion, this pales in comparison with New Zealand’s trade with other smaller Asian nations such as South Korea ($8.8b) or Malaysia ($4.8b).
Clearly, there is ample room for growth with India and it’s important both countries – New Zealand and India – show they can move beyond what has been a recurrent cycle of ambition followed by disappointment. The focus must be on delivering real, mutually beneficial trade growth.
Achieving this in an increasingly unpredictable global environment, and in an age of alpha leadership, is going to require extremely deft handling.
New Zealand’s long-term interests lie in building a stable, broad, and mutually beneficial partnership with India. But if the Khalistan dispute continues to strain India’s relationships with Canada, and potentially other Western partners too, New Zealand could find itself quietly deprioritised.
There is no question New Zealand must adhere to its principles and ensure the rule of law is respected on Canada’s soil. Major powers cannot be given a free pass to target whoever they wish, wherever they wish.
Canada’s outrage has pushed the matter onto the global stage. Whether it means it is any closer to being resolved and relationships restored is another matter.